In her recent book, Mayan Visions, June Nash demonstrates how the indigenous Maya of Chiapas are attempting to assert cultural autonomy through armed uprising (as in the Zapatista takeover of San Cristóbal in January 1994) and through careful negotiation with the Mexican state, which still continues to deny their claims. As she observes in the Preface: 'Mayans retain a sense of their communal identity and the values that sustain an alternative vision to that offered by capitalist development ' (2001: xviii) .
Mayans are challenging not only the threat to their livelihood posed by the incursion of global capitalism, but also the paternalism of the Mexican state. Mexico, like other Latin American and Caribbean countries, predicated the integration of their indigenous and Afrodescendant populations upon a policy of mestizaje. Mestizaje celebrated racial and cultural mixture as a way of forging a unified and homogeneous national image at the same time that it reasserted the supremacy of the European race and civilization by favoring blanqueamiento or whitening. As Nash notes, in Mexico mestizaje was embodied in the paradigm of indigenismo, which dominated Mexican state policy from the time of the 1910 revolution, and 'cultivated a respect for indigenous roots at the same time that it negated self-determination for the Indian population . . . by equating progress with acculturation to European ways ' (2001: 13) .
Mayan communities are not the only indigenous groups in Latin America to contest mestizaje as the protests over the Colombus Quincentenary and nationwide uprisings by indigenous people in Ecuador and other countries attest (cf. Delgado-P., 2002) . Now, Afrodescendant populations (a term inclusive of both mulattos and blacks) in Latin America are joining the indigenous in asking states to recognize their cultural autonomy and to acknowledge their rights to equal participation in the political, social and cultural life of the nation. Though slower to organize than the indigenous, the Afrodescendant movement gained a huge impetus from the preparation for the third United Nations (UN) World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban, South Africa in September 2001. This conference brought Afrodescendant populations from around the globe together for the first time. A major achievement of the Durban process was the recognition by Latin American and Caribbean governments, in the preparatory regional conference in Santiago, Chile in December 2000, that slavery constituted a crime against humanity and was a direct cause of the widespread poverty and marginalization of Afrodescendant peoples in the Americas (Turner, 2002) . This article compares contemporary indigenous and black movements in Latin America in terms of the different ways they are contesting the concept of mestizaje as a framework for nation-building in the region. Through the concept of blanqueamiento or whitening embedded in the process of mestizaje, acceptance of Eurocentric white norms became a criterion for inclusion in the dominant white-mestizo society and a way of developing a homogeneous national culture. Indigenous and Afrodescendant groups are now challenging the superiority of whiteness within the ideology of mestizaje, and arguing that their own cultures should be valued on an equal footing with the European white norms of the dominant sector.
Women are playing an increasing role in both the indigenous and Afrodescendant movement, and this article will compare their struggles to negotiate a place within the larger social movement, traditionally led by men. I will argue that women have faced even greater obstacles to participation among the indigenous than among Afrodescendant groups, where women have traditionally been more autonomous. Gender consciousness is stronger among Afrodescendant women than among indigenous peoples, where it is subordinated to ethnic consciousness.
Why did the Afrodescendant and indigenous movements arise at this particular conjuncture in Latin America? Clearly, they are not the only current groups to challenge the status quo, as the social movements of women, of human rights, of environmentalists and others demonstrate. The emergence of these movements has been linked to the weakness of the Latin American state and to the decline of traditional political parties following the dismantling of authoritarian military regimes. The imposition by external forces of neoliberal policies designed to minimize the state in the name of free trade and a market economy has also been influential. These neoliberal policies, together with globalization, contributed in the 1980s and 1990s to increasing inequality and poverty, reinforced by economic decline and misdistribution of state resources. Consumption, income and indices of health and welfare declined for the poorest and increased at the top, with an erosion of the middle class (Hoffman and Centeño, 2003: 3) . Inequality and growing immiseration increased the urgency of Afrodescendant and indigenous groups to legitimate their claim to resources from the state and recognition of their cultural autonomy. 1 However, Afrodescendants and the indigenous claim these rights not simply as citizens of the state, like peasants or women, but as culturally different groups demanding autonomy within the national state. To legitimate their claim requires resignifying the concept of mestizaje to accommodate a multi-ethnic state, in which the claims of cultural difference are acknowledged and respected, in place of the homogenizing tendency mestizaje celebrated formerly. Respect for cultural differences and support for these racial/ethnic movements was encouraged in Latin America through the spread of liberation theology in the 1970s and the formation of Christian base communities, as well as by the growth of a human rights movement in Latin America. The success of the civil rights movement in the United States, as well as the assumption of political control by black people in Africa, particularly South Africa, inspired Afrodescendants especially. Afrodescendants and the indigenous began to see this as the moment to reject the subordination to which the concept of mestizaje had condemned them, and to press their claims for cultural autonomy within a multi-ethnic state.
Far more has been written about the indigenous than the Afrodescendant movement, partly because the latter is only beginning to emerge. However, Afrodescendant women's organizations are now found in virtually every country in Latin America, as the Network of AfroCaribbean and AfroLatina Women, now based in Costa Rica, will attest. This brief article will highlight Brazil, which has the largest Afrodescendant population in Latin America (and second only to Nigeria in the world) and where the movement is most advanced; Central America, where people of African descent are in a clear minority in mestizo societies; and Colombia, where a large black population is directly threatened by armed conflict. Statistical data by race and gender is still lacking in all areas, even in Brazil, which is the best documented. This lack of data also demonstrates the state's unwillingness to deal with the issue of Afrodescendant people who remain largely invisible. Nevertheless, Afrodescendants are beginning to challenge the old mestizaje or indigenista paradigm, particularly in its emphasis on blanqueamiento or whitening, as will become apparent in the following analysis.
The emergence of indigenous and Afrodescendant movements in Latin America
The special juridical status of indigenous peoples in Latin America may have made it easier for them to organize against the white bias in mestizaje than it has been for Afrodescendants. Certainly, the indigenous population has received much more support from international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) than has the Afrodescendant community. The most important legislation in favour of the indigenous peoples is the ILO Convention, adopted in 1996, on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, designed to pressure nation-states to adopt legislation specifying their rights. The rights of Afrodescendants and indigenous peoples were recognized in the 1988 Constitution of Brazil and the 1991 Constitution of Colombia. But a region-wide declaration is still lacking, even though the number of Afrodescendants is almost five times larger than the indigenous peoples, and they constitute 30 percent of the total population of Latin America and the Caribbean (Bello and Rangel, 2002: 7) .
The special juridical status of indigenous groups in Latin America dates from the colonial period. While mestizaje applied to both indigenous and Afrodescendant groups, Wade (1997) notes that Indians were treated differently. Indigenous slavery was outlawed and Indian resguardos or reserves were placed under the special protection of the Spanish Crown. Indigenous peoples thus had a political and territorial base which contributed to the development of an 'institutionalized identity' that Afrodescendants lacked. Africans, on the contrary, were imported as slave labor and lacked any land of their own (with the exception of some free blacks and runaway slave communities) until after emancipation. Mestizaje was furthered by inter-racial unions, most often between white men and indigenous and African and Afrodescendant women, because of the shortage of white women in the early colonial period. Marriages were allowed with indigenous women, but in the late colonial period were restricted with Afrodescendant women, particularly after the Pragmática issued by the Crown in 1778 (Wade, 1997: 30) . Clearly, such unions continued, but more often as consensual unions lacking legal recognition and inheritance rights.
'Scientific racism', a theory in the late 19th century designed to bolster the superiority of white civilization, condemned mestizos or mulattos as degenerate, because they lacked racial purity. But in the 20th century, after Latin American countries consolidated their independence and started to search for their own identity, this negative concept of racial mixture began to change. Racial and ethnic diversity became valued as distinguishing Latin American societies from Europe, and in the 1920s the Indian became a prime symbol of national identity, especially in Mexico and Peru, which had the largest indigenous populations. The mulatto, although positively 310 Critique of Anthropology 25 (3) revalued, never achieved comparable status in terms of state policy in Latin America, even in Brazil and Cuba, with their large Afrodescendant populations. Social scientists reinforced this distinction, treating the indigenous as a culture worthy of study in its own right (particularly by anthropologists) whereas Afrodescendants were studied primarily by sociologists and historians interested in race relations (Wade, 1997: ch. 3 ). Supposedly lacking a culture of their own, Afrodescendants were regarded as incomplete or deviant versions of Euroamerican culture. This was one of the chief reasons that prompted Melville Herskovits (1941) to write The Myth of the Negro Past, a work which is 'credited with legitimating the study of black cultures within anthropology' (Yelvington, 2001: 228) . This distinction between Afrodescendants and indigenous peoples is reminiscent of the difference in the United States between the treatment of Native Americans as 'nations' (a concept that grew out of the treaties signed by the US with these sovereign entities to end the Indian wars) and of black people as a minority.
After the rejection of scientific racism, due in part to the studies by Boas and others challenging the theory of innate racial differences, the term 'race' came to be abandoned in social sciences and government policy. The indigenous peoples in Latin America were termed an ethnic group, which de la Cadena (2000: 329-30) links to the increasing importance of cultural criteria, such as language and dress, in racial and ethnic designations. However, as she points out, this shift from physical to cultural and later class criteria did little to weaken social hierarchies, which are still used as a basis for discrimination and social exclusion in Latin America today.
Nevertheless, the greater attention in racial classification to cultural and class criteria did contribute to a more fluid concept of race in Latin America and the Caribbean than in the one-drop rule operative in the United States. In Latin America, it was possible for persons to pass out of the indigenous or Afrodescendant communities by adopting the cultural and class characteristics of the dominant white, mestizo society. Education and income 'whitened', contributing to a large intermediate sector of mestizos or mulattos. In several Latin American countries, states consciously tried to whiten the population by encouraging European immigration, but only in Argentina were Afrodescendants virtually erased as a racial group (Andrews, 1980) . This immigration policy again demonstrated the whitening bias embedded in mestizaje, despite its emphasis on biological and cultural mixture.
In Brazil, the term 'race' was replaced by 'ethnicity' in scientific texts and government documents for 50 years, starting in the post-Second World War period, while color categories such as preto (black) or pardo (brown or mulatto) remained (Guimaraes, 2001) . Guimaraes (2001: 39) argues that in Latin America the refutation of the biological foundations of race, or non-racialism, is equated with anti-racism and the impossibility of racial discrimination. This has been used in many Latin American countries to justify the elimination of racial categories from the census, arguing that, if not officially recognized, race cannot serve as the basis for discrimination. However, such a stance ignores the importance of the social construction of race, which goes far beyond official, legal categories and still differentiates and discriminates against the Afrodescendant (and indigenous) population.
In most Latin American countries, Afrodescendants are not included as a census category, rendering them largely invisible. Under pressure, Colombia and Costa Rica have recently included blacks as a census category for the first time, but there was an acknowledged severe undercount of the Afrodescendant population. Part of the problem in Colombia lies in the way racial categories were constructed and enumerated (Urrea et al., 2001) . But the problem also lies with the Afrodescendant population themselves, who are reluctant to identify as black because of the negative stereotypes long associated with blackness (cf. Twine, 1998) . Even in Brazil, there has been a noticeable move since 1940 away from the black to the mulatto or pardo category in the national census (Lovell and Wood, 1998) , which may be explained as a process of cultural whitening. The 'mulatto escape hatch', as Degler (1971) termed it, helped Afrodescendants escape the oppression of blackness and distinguished Brazilian racial stratification from the bipolar construction of race in the US. However, Lovell and Wood (1998) have shown that mulattos and blacks face similar limitations on critical issues such as life expectancy, school enrollment, and occupational distribution, which would seem to invalidate Degler's notion.
The term 'Afrodescendant' used in this article to cover both mulattos and blacks, was promoted by Brazilian black leaders as a way of countering invidious distinctions between the two racial groups. The term 'Afrodescendant' focuses on the African component among the great majority of racially mixed blacks, and thus dismisses the whitening bias inherent in mestizaje. However, it also brings Latin American racial constructs closer to those in the US, since it signifies a change of emphasis from phenotype to descent, and adopts a bipolar dichotomy between Afrodescendant and white, which many Latin American activists strongly reject. Despite the need for greater black solidarity, most Latin American activists prefer their fluid system of racial/ethnic classification to the racial oppositions existing in the US.
The importance of land
Afrodescendants (with some exceptions noted below) were never tied to the land and are today a primarily urban people. Under slavery Afrodescendants were denied a land base and this continued after emancipation. Few were able to purchase land and instead drifted to the cities, where they were employed in low-paid manual jobs (Mayo Santana et al., 1997) . Black and mulatta women, who were largely illiterate, worked largely as domestic servants, laundresses and seamstresses, but they had a much higher labor force participation rate than white women, who were largely confined to the home. Black women had to work because families could not be sustained by a single male breadwinner, and never adopted the 'cult of domesticity' prevalent among the white elite.
Indigenous women also worked, but usually alongside their husbands on the land. As Nash shows, the Maya and other indigenous possessed land, often in closed corporate communities, which was owned collectively. Land helped them preserve their culture and resist the dehumanizing effects of an ever-encroaching market economy. Few Afrodescendant groups could lay claim to such territorial rights except in the palenques and quilombos established by runaway slaves, whose legal right to land was (and is) seldom officially recognized.
Indigenous attachment to the land served as a basis for cultural continuity and the preservation of strong kinship and territorial ties. The importance of land as a basis for cultural autonomy can be seen in the 1996 Convention of the International Labor Organization concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. Article I of this Convention defines beneficiaries in terms of their ancestral or pre-colonial link to land and their maintenance and consciousness of cultural difference. Indigenous and ethnic peoples are represented as naturally 'rooted' to the land and as 'natural conservationists' of local resources (England, 1999) . Here again we find a privileging of indigenous claims over those of Afrodescendants.
The Afro-Colombian communities of the Pacific coast of Colombia developed in isolation after the collapse of the mining economy in the 18th century. They have succeeded in gaining some state recognition of their territorial rights, but far less than the much smaller indigenous communities in the same area (Arocha, 1998) . The indigenous Colombians have been given greater state and international support, and now control 22 percent of the Pacific territory while constituting 2 percent of the population (Wade, 1997: 106) Like the indigenous peoples, Afro-Colombian communities of the Pacific have emphasized the importance of maintaining control over their territories and natural resources as a precondition for the survival and strength of their culture (Grueso et al., 1998) . Like the Maya, their demands reject integration (based on mestizaje) and traditional developmental formulations in favor of the construction of their own collective identity based on territorial autonomy. Yet autonomous movements among both Afro-Columbians and indigenous peoples in the Pacific region have been seriously weakened by traditional developmentalism, clientelistic politics and particularly armed conflict (Grueso et al., 1998) . Both groups now face massacre and large-scale displacement from their riverine communities as a result of harassment by the Colombian army, paramilitaries and drugs traders. Foreign capital investment in the The Garifuna, who are spread over five Central American countries, with large populations in Honduras and Belize, have also made land claims dating back to their arrival in Honduras in 1797 (Gonzalez, 1988) . They were forcibly relocated by the British at that time from St Vincent in the Caribbean, where African runaway slaves had married Carib women and resisted British occupation of the island. Their arrival in Honduras prior to the formation of the Honduran state gives them land claims as an 'autochthonous' group, that is, not indigenous, but with a status equivalent to that of the original inhabitants (England, 1999) . Because of their dual indigenous and Afrodescendant identity, they can ally with either group, but in daily practice, the Garifuna mainly self-identify as blacks. The Garifuna distinguish themselves from other blacks (like the Afro-Creoles) as being 'authentic' and never having assimilated to European culture. However, their efforts to maintain the Garifuna language and other distinctive cultural traits seem overwhelmed by their adoption of Catholicism (and now Pentecostalism) and by the political and economic pressure to speak Spanish as their lingua franca. Even in Belize, considered the homeland of the Garifuna (although they are now outnumbered by mestizos), in 1990 only one community continued to speak the vernacular language (Cayetano and Cayetano, 1997) .
Much Garifuna land in Honduras, which still has the largest Garifuna population of about 200,000, is now under threat from tourism development and mestizo colonization along the Atlantic Coast, both of which are encouraged by the Honduran state (Thorne, 2004) . A Garifuna organization in Honduras called ODECO has succeeded in prodding the Honduran government into recognizing the Garifuna right to land, and by 2001, 39 collective titles to land had been granted, totaling 32,000 hectares, some of which is still in dispute. However, ODECO competes with OFRANEH, another Garifuna NGO, for the loyalty of the Garifuna population on the north coast of Honduras (Brondo, 2003) . They are split ideologically, with ODECO advocating a developmentalist approach within the framework of the Honduran state, while OFRANEH is more separatist and opposed to development. ODECO is also led by a man (with a largely female staff), while OFRANEH is led by women.
The split within the Garifuna community in Honduras and their distance from other Afrodescendant groups such as the Afro-Creoles, with whom they share much of the Atlantic coast of Honduras and the rest of Central America, has seriously weakened Afrodescendant solidarity in Central America. In 1995, they formed a joint organization, called CABO (Central American Black Organization), but their mutual disdain is evident.
The Afro-Creole community also claims autochthonous status, since they were originally brought into Honduras and Nicaragua in the mid-18th 314 Critique of Anthropology 25(3) century by the British, who at that time controlled much of the Atlantic coast (Gordon, 1998: 33) . The original settlers were augmented in the 19th century by much larger numbers of laborers brought from the West Indies by the British to build a railroad and work on banana plantations. Favored by the British, and speaking English, the Afro-Creoles gained a higher status than the Garifuna, whom they treated with disrespect. Afro-Creoles have a much higher educational level than the Garifuna, whose rural population is still largely illiterate.
Both Afro-Creoles and Garifuna worked on the railroad, on banana plantations (operated largely by United Fruit) and on the docks. Garifuna men spoke English at this time and were excellent seamen, while women did most of the subsistence cultivation supplemented by fishing along the Atlantic coast. Heavy involvement in wage labor by the Afro-Creoles, and to a lesser extent by the Garifuna, weakened their claims to land, and in most Central American countries they are now increasingly urban. Their ethnic standing was further diminished by mass male migration to the US following the collapse of the banana economy and severe hurricanes (including Hurricane Mitch in 1998, which destroyed much of the Honduran coast). Today much of the remaining Garifuna and Afro-Creole population in Central America is dependent on remittances, sent principally from the US. Remittances have helped build a professional class in both communities, and there are close links between the Garifuna of Honduras and their migrant relatives in the US. It is estimated that 70 percent of the Honduran population in New York City is Garifuna. In fact, England (1999) argues that what is emerging is a new ethnic identity as a Garifuna nation, tied by common language, culture and history, which is not bound by any territorial state.
However, to press their land claims, the Garifuna must continue to legitimate their status as an autochthonous people tied to territorially bounded communities. Outside this space, as England (1999: 41) shows, their 'authenticity and often the rights that go with it become questioned'. This is also true for indigenous people like the Maya who are migrating in increasing numbers, driven off the land by armed strife, poverty and capitalist development. The lack of a territorial base has made it more difficult for Afrodescendants to challenge mestizaje as the indigenous peoples have done. Afrodescendants, even more than the indigenous peoples, have consciously had to build pride and dignity in their own culture, as we shall see in the following section.
The search for cultural autonomy
Autonomy is important for both Afrodescendants and the indigenous peoples, because it signifies respect for their cultural differences and more control over their own resources. As Nash and others have pointed out, autonomy does not mean secession or balkanization, but 'prioritizing the fulfillment of basic community needs' (Delgado-P., 2002: 37) . Thus, it would seem that the fragmentation that Latin American nations feared would result from racial and ethnic diversity is unwarranted. In fact, as I have argued, most Afrodescendant groups are not rejecting mestizaje per se, but rather the bias toward blanqueamiento promoted in its earlier Eurocentric versions.
The meaning of autonomy would appear to be quite different in the indigenous and Afrodescendant movements. For the Maya and other indigenous peoples, autonomy means recognition of their territorial rights and respect for their cultural differences. Nash (n.d.) also distinguishes indigenous autonomy from its meaning in Western society: 'It does not, as Zapatistas say, mean to be free of all constraints, but to accept the collective will as one's own. Nor does it mean unlimited privileges, but rather to earn the rights of belonging through responsible participation.' The importance placed on collective will also constrains indigenous women's autonomy, as we shall see shortly.
Afrodescendants do not place nearly as much emphasis on the collective. They are a more urbanized, wage-earning community, which has favored the process of individualization. They are aware that to press their demands for legitimation and against social marginality requires open access to the resources of the larger society and strong involvement with institutions like labor unions, political parties and religion. Culture has also played an important role in the formation of black identity, especially in Brazil, where the blocos afros, musical groups rooted in Salvador, were formed to reinforce a politics of identity among Afro-Brazilians, emphasizing self-esteem, anti-racism and equality in difference. Rather than autonomy, the term 'community' became important, not in a territorial sense, but including 'all those who share an identity by their exclusion and marginality ' (da Cunha, 1998: 236) . The emphasis on culture helps explain why heavily populated black areas like Bahia retain a strong African identity (Walker, 2002) , but the appropriation of black culture by the national society has weakened its potential as a strategy for mobilization. Hanchard (1994) even argues that appropriation of Afro-Brazilian culture by the national society as commodities of popular culture hinders the growth of racial consciousness among Afro-Brazilians.
The Afro-Brazilian population is the least territorially based of the Afrodescendant communities studied here, since with migration to São Paulo and other areas of the south-east, they are now spread throughout the country. Strong racial regional differences remain, however, and the poverty of the north-east, where most Afro-Brazilians still live, helps explain their marginalization. In 1999, Afro-Brazilians, who constituted about 45 percent of the Brazilian population, represented 64 percent of the poor population, and 69 percent of the indigent or very poor (Henriques, 2001) . Indices of racial inequality have recently been well documented, in areas like education, employment, housing and income. In 2003, only 2 percent of the national deputies were black (Htun, 2004: 69-89) .
Brazil has long been upheld as a 'racial democracy', a thesis which argued that racial inequality was basically the result of poverty and class differences, and would disappear with development. However, the continuing racial gaps in socio-economic status following the period of rapid economic growth from 1960 to 1980, and the growth of a black middle class which still suffers from racial discrimination, have weakened the belief in racial democracy. As a result, there has been strong pressure in the 1990s to initiate a program of affirmative action for Afrodescendants, backed by state policy under then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and accelerated as a result of strong Brazilian participation in the UN World Conference Against Racism in Durban in 1996 (Htun, 2004) . Some universities have recently adopted admission quotas for blacks ranging from 30 to 40 percent, a policy reinforced under the present Lula government, which also created a Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality. Affirmative action policies have been strongly opposed on the grounds that they will only benefit the black middle class and may reinforce racial divisions, leading to racial dichotomies as in the United States. It is also argued that affirmative action is producing racial divisions among working-class Brazilians, where traditionally racial discrimination was less than among other class groups.
The proliferation of Afro-Brazilian organizations has not yet achieved mass support among the Afrodescendant population (Hasenbalg and Silva, 1999: 164-5) , for reasons about which there is still much debate. The current Afro-Brazilian movement dates back to the founding of the MNU (Movimento Negro Unificado) in 1978, and now Afrodescendant organizations number 2000 (Morrison, 2002) . Still many Afrodescendants are reluctant to identify with blackness, which continues to carry a negative connotation. The black middle class has worked hard to create respect and dignity for Afrodescendants through efforts to affirm a cultural heritage and to improve indices of racial inequality. It is the black professional middle class that has provided the principal leadership for Afrodescendant NGOs and work for affirmative action and other policy measures. But class and color differentiation persists, and continues to fragment the black community. Because of the co-optive strategy of mestizaje, which convinced mulattos they were more like whites than like their black brothers, there is also a reluctance to create confrontational racial blocs such as exist in the US. The irony, as Hasenbalg and Silva (1999: 160) point out, is that since 1950, as a result of civil rights and affirmative action policies, 'indexes of inequality began to decline in the U.S., while in Brazil, they remained stable and in some areas worsened'. As a result, by 1980, the US had become a more racially equal society than Brazil.
I would argue that weak black solidarity in Brazil may also be due to sharp class stratification, and to the close link between racial and class inequality. Since most Afrodescendants are poor, class consciousness may be more important than race consciousness, at least among the working class. Race has never served as the basis for any form of legal discrimination in Brazil, nor as the basis for residential segregation, but there are marked class residential differences (Telles, 1999) . In a recent article examining the relative importance of social and racial characteristics in determining treatment in Rio's criminal courts between 1930 and 1964 , Fischer (2004 shows how poverty has been racialized, identifying traits such as ignorance, criminality and sexual promiscuity with people of color. She concludes that, for Brazil, race and class is a false dichotomy, and that 'the lie at the heart of the myth of racial democracy was not necessarily in the overwhelming prevalence of open and purposeful racial discrimination, but rather in the fallacy that social discrimination could be practiced free from racial implications' (Fischer, 2004: 59) . The recent success of the Workers Party, which won strong black support in the 2002 election, suggests that Afro-Brazilians may be choosing to achieve their rights through a class-based group such as a political party or a labor union rather than through a race-based movement (Guimaraes, 2001 ). The relative lack of racial discrimination in the working class combined with the poverty of a near majority of white Brazilians strengthens the possibilities for inter-racial class solidarity among the Brazilian poor.
Gender subordination in Afrodescendant and indigenous communities
Racial and ethnic solidarity is critical for advancing the claims of the Afrodescendant and indigenous movements in Latin America, but the organizations leading this movement are often led by men. Men often cite the need for solidarity as a reason for subordinating women within the movement. Yet increasing numbers of women in both the Afrodescendant and indigenous communities are speaking out, and sometimes forming their own organizations. They want a stronger voice in these movements, and would like to address specific women's concerns such as domestic abuse or reproductive health. They were stimulated by the growth of the feminist movement in Latin America, but felt the larger white-led movement neglected their concerns.
Afrodescendants and the indigenous peoples maintain different gender ideologies from the larger mestiza society. The primary goal of the larger feminist movement was to abolish patriarchy, which led them to see men as the enemy. Patriarchy in mestizo society was reinforced by a gender ideology based on the model of the male breadwinner, which relegated women to the role of dependent housewives. This gender ideology was also inscribed in the moral and sexual codes of mestizaje and privileged men as wage-earners and heads of the household. Carol Smith (1997) has shown how the conquest ideology of white elite men legitimated a double standard, confining elite women to the home but exposing non-elite women to men as sexual predators. This undercut mestizo male authority over their own women. Working-class mestizo men adopted this same ideology as a way of equalizing their inferior status and, like elite men, regarded women as male possessions. Thus mestiza women were subordinated both sexually and economically, until economic opportunities opened up that enabled them to challenge this patriarchal structure. Female autonomy took the form of more open relations with men, resulting in high rates of illegitimacy and female heads of household, which are still characteristic of most of Central America today.
Since colonial times, Afrodescendant and indigenous women never shared in the ideology of the male breadwinner, and for this reason were seen as immoral and uncivilized. These women could not depend on a male breadwinner because of the limited resources available to both communities. Women had to take on additional responsibility for the household, and were accustomed to a considerable degree of economic autonomy. Afrodescendant women also enjoyed considerable sexual autonomy, and, like some mestiza women, were characterized by high rates of illegitimacy and female heads of household. Sexual and economic autonomy contributed to the development of a strong gender consciousness in the Afrodescendant community, where women regarded themselves as the equals of men, and never dependent.
Indigenous women, though economically productive, were largely confined to the domestic realm to protect them from the advances of sexually predatory mestizo men. Indigenous peoples maintained a system of gender complementarity, which, as Cervone (2002: 190) observes, is quite different from gender equality in liberal Western feminism. While gender equality argues that men and women are the same, and therefore should be given equal opportunities, gender complementarity argues for 'equality in diversity'. 'Women are not just like men, they are different; but it is precisely their difference that legitimizes their capabilities and establishes their rights to the same opportunities as men ' (2002: 190) . However, as Carol Smith (1996: 159) observes, the closed boundaries of the indigenous community did restrict women's sexuality and economic autonomy. As the repositories of cultural tradition, women were expected to marry within their village or ethnic group and not to seek work beyond its boundaries. Women who did so were rejected as ethnically disloyal, thereby maintaining ethnic solidarity.
The system of gender complementarity in the indigenous community is under increasing strain. With increasing involvement in a market economy and state policies encroaching upon indigenous autonomy, indigenous women and men were often forced to seek outside employment to sustain their smallholder economy. This increased women's exposure to mestizo men, though Carol Smith (1997) notes that women who have 319 Safa: Challenging Mestizaje illegitimate children are permitted to return to the indigenous community, where their children are raised as indigenous. Men were often the first to migrate and to learn Spanish and adopt Western dress. Men's economic importance increases as they migrate to work in cities or abroad, or take government positions in politics or development projects. Despite the increase in gender antagonism, most indigenous women would not define men as the enemy, because the ethnic struggle for autonomy is supreme, and cannot be challenged by gender divisions. Hence indigenous women subordinate gender consciousness to ethnic consciousness, even while they are forming their own organizations to promote women's needs. Nash's (2003) analysis of the indigenous women's struggle in Chiapas illustrates the contradictions indigenous women are facing. In her view, Zapatista women are trying to abolish all forms of hierarchy, including male domination in the home. Men were privileged throughout the seven decades during which the PRI enjoyed monopoly of power, up to 2000. Men were given priority in schools, in development and training programs, and in the granting of ejido land. Women did receive assistance in marketing artisan products starting in the 1970s, and benefited from medical programs to reduce maternal death in childbirth (still six times higher in Chiapas than nationally) and infant mortality (which still stands at 150 per 1000). But women received less attention and thus 'were not tied to paternalistic structures of the PRI government to the extent that men were' (Nash, 2003: 8) .
The resistance of Zapatista women to male dominance grew during the economic crisis of the 1980s. Women's artisan production became important, first as an added source of household income, and, with the onset of the crisis, as a way to sustain small plot cultivation. However, attempts by women to challenge male authority led to an increase in domestic abuse. Indigenous women have become a major target of paramilitary youth recruited from their own Zapatista villages by the PRI to deliberately destroy the reproductive base of the Zapatista community. Literacy and knowledge of Spanish is still much lower among Zapatista women than men, which further restricts women to the home.
Nevertheless, women constituted 30 percent of the combat ranks of the EZLN (the Zapatista army), and a Women's Bill of Rights was issued along with the New Revolutionary Law proclaimed in January 1994. Nash (2003: 11) observes how, inspired by this declaration:
. . . indigenous women are linking the demands for cultural autonomy to selfdetermination and the rights of women. This translates into demands for the right to communal and private lands after divorce, to choose their own husband, to have the number of children they wish, and to be respected and not be subject to the abuse of husbands and relatives. Women's subordination to male figures, their fathers or husbands, was condoned as 'tradition' in most indigenous communities. Laws granting women suffrage in 1950 and those that allocated specific land claims to women, were ignored in local custom.
Still, women have paid a heavy price for their championing of women's rights. When the woman who was president of the first pottery cooperative in the community of Amatenango del Valle dared to run for political office in 1980, her opponent had her gunned down.
While the Zapatista women's struggle may be the best known, indigenous women's struggles have now spread to Central America and the Andes. Because of the political sensitivity of women's issues, indigenous women are forced to produce distinct forms of leadership combining ethnic and gender consciousness. In her comparison of two indigenous women leaders in Ecuador, Cervone (2002) notes that both women agree on the need to work with men because women's claims still lack legitimacy.
The control of indigenous women's sexuality can be seen in the contrasting depictions of La Malinche, the indigenous woman taken by Cortes during the Spanish Conquest. For many years, she was seen as a traitor to Indian racial purity, which indigenous women were expected to maintain. However, feminists and Chicanas have reinvented her as the progenitor of the mestiza caste, and a victim of Cortes' predatory sexuality (Mallon, 1996) . In Cuzco, according to de la Cadena (2002), rural indigenous women took as their symbol an Indian goddess symbolizing racial purity. Indians despise mestizas as immoral and degenerate (as they were once despised by early colonial society). However, this goddess was repudiated by the urban market women, who saw mestizas not as traitors but as the road to progress. The urban market women, or 'indigenous mestizas', as they call themselves, replaced the code of decencia or decency with the code of respeto or respect, which repudiated sexual propriety in favor of a work ethic that released women from dependency and the protection of men.
Here we see again, in line with Carol Smith, how mestiza women challenge patriarchy through their work. As these market women acquired more education, income, and urban dress and refinement, they consciously shed their indigenous identity in favor of a mestizo identity. In these women, class consciousness appears to supersede ethnic identity and solidarity. The image of the marketplace was also transformed from a site of filth and disease into a symbol of popular class struggle. De la Cadena (2002: 172) argues that this process decolonized mestizaje, because these indigenous mestizas are not disappearing into a homogeneous mestizo culture, but defining a new form of mestiza distinguished from Indians not ethnically but socially.
Can women reject patriarchal subordination and develop gender consciousness and still maintain ethnic or racial solidarity? Does gender (and/or class) consciousness necessarily weaken ethnic/racial solidarity? Let us examine this question by looking at the Afro-Creole women of the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, who have long enjoyed a higher educational and occupational status than their indigenous neighbors, partly as a result of their British West Indian heritage and also because of 321 Safa: Challenging Mestizaje the educational efforts of the Moravian Church in Nicaragua (Gordon, 1998) . Like all Afrodescendants, they have a high labor force participation rate that is associated with a high percentage of female heads of household. The Garifuna in the same area are plagued by low levels of education and employment, and high fertility, but Garifuna women are also very selfreliant, especially since men often worked away from home, and are now also migrating in larger numbers. Thorne (n.d.) credits Garifuna women with winning partial land rights in Honduras for their community.
It is clear that neither the Garifuna nor the Afro-Creoles ever shared in the myth of the male breadwinner, which persuaded many white and mestiza women to rely on their husbands as economic providers (Safa, 1995) . The racial and class barriers faced by most Afrodescendant men in Central America reduce their capacity to be adequate breadwinners, and this is aggravated by decades of large-scale male emigration, particularly on the Atlantic coast. Emigration has also reinforced in both Afro-Creole and Garifuna women the need for sexual as well as economic autonomy, and contributed to a stronger gender consciousness than among the indigenous women reviewed earlier.
At the same time, Afro-Creole and Garifuna women have had to maintain a high degree of ethnic solidarity because of the intense ethnic rivalry plaguing the variety of indigenous and racial groups on the Atlantic coast, particularly in Nicaragua. The indigenous Miskito, with some support from other ethnic groups, had succeeded in having the Sandinista government in Nicaragua legally grant these groups some cultural and political autonomy in 1987. However, with the fall of the Sandinistas and the election of a neoliberal government, little has been done to implement this Autonomy Law. With the support of the state, mestizo migrants from the interior of Nicaragua have grown more dominant demographically and politically, and have taken economic control of the Atlantic coast. The AfroCreole population in Nicaragua has a higher level of education than other ethnic groups on the coast, and once dominated this enclave. But their ability to resist mestizo encroachment is waning, as increasing numbers migrate abroad, while the remaining Afro-Creole population is dependent on remittances. Male emigration contributes to the increase in female heads of household, who now constitute about one-third of the households of the Atlantic coast population.
The Afro-Creole population is making more progress in Costa Rica, where ethnic autonomy receives more state support, including the election of Afrodescendant and indigenous political representatives. Epsy Campbell, the former President of the Network of Afro-Caribbean and Afro-Latin American Women, an outspoken advocate of both gender and racial rights, was elected as a deputy through a new political party in 2002. A 1990 study of the Afro-Creole population of Limon by McIlwaine (1997) suggests that women are faring better than men, and are more competitive than mestiza women. Afro-Creole women have higher educational levels 322 Critique of Anthropology 25 (3) than mestizas, and earn more. Afro-Creole women are also more likely to be employed in professional jobs such as nursing and teaching. Incomes within Afro-Creole households are higher because of higher labor force participation by Afro-Creole women and because of remittances, especially from abroad (mainly the US), which constitute 70 percent of non-earned income (McIlwaine, 1997: 42) . As McIlwaine (1997) points out, paid employment has long been at the core of Afro-Creole women's identity, whereas mestiza women are more closely identified with the domestic domain, and face more male restrictions on working. Here we see again the consequences of different gender ideologies for Afrodescendant and mestiza women. However, Afro-Creole women remain virtually excluded from key decision-making positions occupied by mestizo men, even in health and education, where women predominate. Afro-Creole men have also been largely confined to manual jobs in the port and the railway. These jobs are declining, as the railway closes down (in favor of a new superhighway) while cargo services at the port have been automated. Since both AfroCaribbean men and women work primarily in public sector jobs, they have been severely impacted by government budget cuts and now face high levels of unemployment. As in Nicaragua, this has contributed to large-scale migration, estimated in the early 1990s at 30 percent, primarily of men (McIlwaine, 1997: 46) .
Afro-Creoles in Costa Rica did not obtain citizenship until 1949, after a long struggle by the black elite to achieve recognition, primarily through assimilation to dominant Hispanic norms of respectability. 2 In the 1920s and 1930s, the black lower class, and particularly women, were repudiated: as women who worked and female heads of households, they did not conform to middle-class norms of femininity, domesticity and sexual purity (Foote, 2004) . Similar to the black-led male movements of today, the Garveyists of the 1920s continued to privilege men and marginalize women. In the same way, the white feminist movement and political parties of that time failed to address the needs of black women, much as they do today. The class tensions evident among Afro-Creoles in Costa Rica demonstrate the extent to which the black elite also supported the white bias in mestizaje, disguised as class morality (Putnam, 2002) . These class tensions were also evident in other black communities in the Americas, where whiteness was identified with respectability and social mobility.
The Brazilian belief in racial democracy also emphasized the importance of class over race, contributing to continuing class fragmentation among Afro-Brazilians. Class divisions among Afro-Brazilian women are clearly quite strong, particularly with the growth of an educated brown middle class after the fall of the military dictatorship in the early 1980s. Afro-Brazilian women have made greater educational gains than black men, and are now entering the university at a proportionately faster rate than white women, though the racial gap between the two groups of women remains (Sutherland, 2002) . Since the 1960s, Afro-Brazilian women have made the greatest absolute gains in white-collar work, and, while they still lag far behind white women, they are better represented than black men in professional and technical occupations (Lovell, 2000b) . They also continue to have a higher labor force participation rate than white women, which is associated with the high percentage of female-headed households, reaching 26 percent of families in 1998 (Teles Costa, 2002) . Sixty percent of female-headed households are Afro-Brazilian (AMB, 2001: 18) , and they are often the poorest of the poor (earning less than one minimum salary).
Afro-Brazilian women realize they cannot rely simply on the larger feminist movement to fulfill their demands for both racial and gender equality. Afro-Brazilian women participated heavily in the larger feminist movement in Brazil, and learned important ways to organize and recruit base support. Thanks to this strong feminist movement, in Brazil there has actually been more improvement in reducing inequality by gender rather than by race. Overall, gender gaps in years of schooling and illiteracy have been done away with, but the educational differential between blacks and whites has remained virtually unchanged since the 1920s (Henriques, 2001) . Among women, illiteracy is 22 percent for Afro-Brazilians versus 10 percent for white women (Sant'Anna, 2001: 19) . Many of these poorly educated women remain in the countryside, or they are working in the informal economy, chiefly as domestic servants, in which half of all employed black women worked in 1991 (Lovell, 2000b: 284) .
Wage discrimination by race and gender is also evident. Despite their educational and occupational gains, Afro-Brazilian women continue to lag behind black men in wages, while both earn less than white women and especially white men. In 1991 in São Paulo, the average monthly wage of Afro-Brazilians and women was roughly 60 percent the respective wage of whites and men (Lovell, 2000b: 286) . The racial wage gap actually increases with education for both Afro-Brazilian women and men, suggesting that better schooling and jobs cannot by themselves eliminate the racial and gender wage gaps (Arias et al., 2002; Lovell, 2000b: 286) . The gender wage gap shrank by about 1 percent a year between 1987 and 1998, while the race-based wage gap did not budge (Soares, 2000) .
The disadvantaged position in which Afro-Brazilian middle-class women found themselves, despite their educational gains, is undoubtedly what motivated many of them to form black women's organizations to redress these inequities. Much of the work of the best known Afro-Brazilian women's NGOs such as Criola, Geledes and Fala Preta is devoted to exposing the racist bias in the health care system, particularly in the area of reproductive health among women. Even though life expectancy increased for both blacks and whites between 1950 and 1980, the gap remained approximately the same (Lovell and Wood, 1998: 95) , with Afro-Brazilians living about seven years less than white people. Infant mortality is twice as high among mothers of color than among white women, among whom the rate shrank twice as much as among Afro-Brazilians between 1977 and 1993 (da Cunha, 2001 ). Again we see how gender inequality has received greater attention in Brazil than racial inequality, favoring white middle-class women.
The Brazilian case points to the need for continuing pressure from below to address both racial and gender inequalities in Latin America. The pressure that the strong women's movement in Brazil put on state policy starting in the 1980s, combined with the efforts of women to obtain better educational and occupational status, has helped reduce gender inequalities, but white women have benefited more than Afro-Brazilian women, particularly at the professional level. This realization helped women to organize, and to become more involved in policy. Afro-Brazilian women have been elected to important posts at the municipal as well as the federal level, and form one-third of the National Council of Women's Rights in Brazil. Under the Lula government, three black women have been named to ministerial posts, and six black women were elected deputies in 2002.
But the great majority of Afro-Brazilians remain socially excluded. 'White' Brazil is 2.5 times wealthier than black Brazil; black Brazilians are concentrated in the low-income categories, and this has not altered with economic growth (Henriques, 2001) . Although there have been improvements in the education and occupational profile of both the white and black populations since 1960, and the middle class has grown considerably, the gap between the races has remained virtually constant. This undermines the thesis of racial democracy and suggests that economic growth alone will not reduce racial inequalities.
Conclusion
Structural factors such as collective control of land and a strong cultural heritage favor ethnic consciousness among indigenous peoples as compared with racial consciousness among Afrodescendants, but this strong ethnic solidarity also subordinated women and inhibited the growth of gender consciousness among indigenous women. Racial solidarity is more difficult to achieve among the urbanized, wage-earning Afrodescendants, but gender consciousness is stronger, particularly in Brazil.
Afrodescendant women have long played an active and independent role in the social reproduction of their communities, with high labor force participation rates and high percentages of female-headed households. Though many of these households are poor, women also learned early that they should not depend on men and needed to personally assure the survival of their families, which gave them considerable economic as well as sexual autonomy. This autonomy was initially rejected by the black elite, because it failed to conform to dominant Hispanic norms of respectability and sexuality. This produced class tensions within the Afrodescendant community which continue to fragment the black community today, despite the black elite's overt rejection of the white bias in mestizaje.
Class divisions are also apparent in indigenous communities, as Nash has shown in Chiapas and de la Cadena in Cuzco. Ethnic solidarity among indigenous peoples is being eroded by growing involvement in a market economy, which is drawing men and women into wage labor in the cities, and now increasingly as illegal migrants to the US. It is too early to tell whether the weakening of ethnic solidarity, which seriously limited women's mobility and autonomy within indigenous communities, will contribute to the growth of gender consciousness among indigenous women. Certainly, like Afrodescendants, indigenous women have long played a critical role in social reproduction and learned to not depend solely on men for survival. Strong indigenous women leaders do emerge, such as the women comandantes of the Zapatistas or Rigoberta Menchu of Guatemala, but they do so in the face of tremendous odds against them.
Both indigenous and Afrodescendant groups question the traditional ideology of mestizaje in terms of its white bias and Eurocentric norms. Both gorups have succeeded in promoting a more positive image of their communities, both within their own communities and among the elite, and are gaining legitimacy as full citizens worthy of specific public policy aimed at redressing past wrongs. The elite has pushed for recognition of greater cultural autonomy through territorial rights, bilingual education, curriculum reform and affirmative action programs in education and employment. They have become less ashamed of female-headed households and other supposed signs of family disorganization in the black community, as black (and white) elite women themselves assert their economic and sexual autonomy. But class divisions remain, as can be seen in the difficulty the leadership of the Afrodescendant movement has in garnering mass support for racial solidarity in Brazil. The recent electoral success of the Workers Party in Brazil suggests the possibility of a hegemonic class-based interracial movement stemming from below, which would be something new in Latin American electoral politics. The role that women play in these Afrodescendant and indigenous movements certainly warrants further study, to see how the growth of ethnic and racial consciousness can be combined with concern for gender rights to promote greater social justice in the Latin American and Caribbean region.
Notes
1 A more detailed discussion of these processes is beyond the scope of the present article, but would focus on the consequences of de-industrialization, the debt crisis, and the role of multilateral lending institutions and foreign capital in general in restructuring regional and national economies and societies. 2 Similar class differences between the brown elite and the black lower class with regard to proper feminine behavior have been noted in the Anglophone Caribbean (Hodge, 1982; Safa, 1986) , and could constitute an alternative source for these norms of respectability.
